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Article 4

CLASSIFICATION OF CONSUMER
PROTECTION STATUTES
As Mrs. Knauer has pointed out, the President has called for
more sweeping and pervasive consumer protection statutes.' The
question must be asked: "What is the scope of present consumer
protection legislation?" "Do we need more legislation; or rather do
we need a re-thinking of consumer problems?" In the next few
paragraphs, one set of parameters on the problem will be explored.
There are basically three types of "consumer protection" statutes;
it is the purpose here to explore these conceptually.
I. DISCLOSURE STATUTES
The Fair Packaging and Labeling Act 2 is a fairly recent example
of a disclosure consumer protection statute 3 Its expressed purpose
is to allow the consumer to make an intelligent choice among different products. This act is not dissimilar in concept to the New York
City ordinance which requires "unit-pricing."
II. FRAUD AND DECEPTIVE PRACTICES
Another type of legislative scheme is that presented by the
proposed Uniform Consumer Sales Practices Act (working draft)
and a portion of the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act,4 as
well as criminal and civil provisions of the United States Code
dealing with the Postal Service.5 Statutes of this type are designed
to "outlaw" certain types of practices-declaring them unlawful
and giving the consumer some relief under the statute. To a great
extent these legislative schemes were probably and properly designed to accomplish other ends, 6 but under the current concern for
the consumer, they have been extended to cover this situation also7
III. TRUE PROTECTION STATUTES
The third type of consumer protection scheme could quite truthfully be characterized as a consumer protection statute. An example
1

U.S. Code Congressional and Administrative News, 91st Cong., 1st
Sess., 1730 (Nov. 20, 1969).

2 Act of Nov. 3, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-755, 80 Stat. 1296.
3 See also Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1601 (1964), as amended,
(Supp. IV, 1968).

4 For a similar act see LocA
(1969).
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5 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1964); 39 U.S.C. § 4005 (1964).
6 See Proceedings in Committee of the Whole, Uniform Sales Practices
7

Act, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (Aug. 6, 1969).
See Dole, Merchant and Consumer Protection:The Uniform Deceptive
Trade Practices Act, 76 YALE L.J. 485 (1967).
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of this sort of statute would be the Food, Drug, and Cosmetics Act 8
whereby a federal agency is given the power to investigate and
remove a product from the market. Clearly, this sort of procedure is
beyond the ken of the average consumer.
IV. COST-BENEFIT NOTIONS
Protecting the consumer has a cost. Is the price worth the value
received? Since most costs in this sort of distributional chain are
passed on to the consumer, one must ask the question: "Is he getting
a benefit commensurate with the cost?" It is clear that in certain
technical areas, the consumer must be advised, e.g., food and drugs.
This concept would tend to legitimatize legislation of the third type
mentioned above. As to disclosure statutes, the cost may well be
greater than the benefit. As to deception and fraud legislation, there
are two possible ways of enforcing this type of legislation (as is
true with the other types of legislation), that is, by public and private action. In either case, there is a direct cost to prosecuting the
action. Is the cost of this prosecution worth the cost of the benefit
to be gained therefrom? The answer may well be no.
V. A CONSIDERATION
The purpose of the foregoing classification and discourse was to
point out what few commentators bother to point out, that is, that
there is another side to the consumer-benefiting side of the consumer protection coin, even considering the problem from the standpoint of the consumer, as the costs of protecting him will usually be
passed onto him. Perhaps, as an added parameter, when one reacts
to consumer protection legislation, he should consider the cost which
will be passed on to the consumer, and not so blithely offer to
protect him with no thought to the overall effect.
The Editors

8 21 U.S.C. § 301 (1964).

